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I. INTRODUCTION
Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John, bless the bed that I lie on.  Before I
lay me down to sleep, I give my soul to Christ to keep.  Four corners
to my bed, four angels there aspread, two to foot, and two to head, and
two to carry me when I’m dead.  I go by sea, I go by land, the Lord
made me by his right hand.  If any danger comes to me, Sweet Jesus
Christ, deliver me.  He’s the branch, and I’m the flower, pray God
send me a happy hour.  And if I die before I wake, I pray that Christ
my soul will take.2
The words of the ancient English children’s prayer take on a particular
poignancy whenever a child dies, but never more than when a child dies
of an easily treatable illness.  Because some parents subscribe to religious
beliefs that discourage them from seeking medical treatment for their
children, a number of American children die unnecessarily every year.
Pediatrician Seth Asser, a respected Rhode Island physician, published a
study about children who died after their parents attempted to cure such
illnesses as diabetes, meningitis, and bowel obstructions with prayer
alone.  In commenting on Asser’s study one author wrote:
2. A Classic Childs Prayer, UNSOLVED MYSTERIES (Sept. 25, 2010, 2:48 PM), http://
www.unsolvedmysteries.com/usm532479.html?t=prayers.  For a discussion about the his-
tory and variations of this Old English prayer, see Evelyn Carington, A Note on the “White
Paternoster,” 2 FOLK-LORE REC. 127, 127 (1879), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/
i253454.  The more familiar American version of the prayer is as follows: “Now I lay me
down to sleep.  I pray the Lord my soul to keep.  If I should die before I wake, I pray the
Lord my soul to take.” Catholic Spirituality, CATHOLIC HOME, http://catholichome.
webs.com/catholicprayers.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012).
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[Asser] estimated that one to two dozen American children die each
year because their parents neglect to get them medical help, choos-
ing instead to pray for their healing . . . .
. . . .
Asser and child advocate Rita Swan worked together on a study of
172 child deaths due to what they called religion-based medical neg-
lect and found that 140 of them would have had a 90 percent chance
of survival and [eighteen] others a 50 percent chance of survival with
proper medical care.  “Most were ordinary illnesses that no one dies
from—appendicitis, pneumonia . . . .—and many of them died slow,
horrible deaths, without the benefit of (pain-relief) medicine,” . . . .3
What is distinctly confounding in these tragic situations is how often
states seem to aid and abet the parents in the death of the child by afford-
ing them specific statutory immunity from prosecution, but then con-
found the issue by prosecuting the parents nonetheless.
The majority of states now provide either partial or absolute religious
statutory immunity for parents who withhold treatment until the child
dies.  Arkansas’s capital-murder statute contains an absolute immunity
religious exemption statute:
(a) A person commits capital murder if: . . .
. . . .
(9)(A) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the
value of human life, the person knowingly causes the death of a per-
son fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time the murder was
committed if the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older at
the time the murder was committed.
(B) It is an affirmative defense to any prosecution under this subdivi-
sion (a)(9) arising from the failure of the parent, guardian, or person
standing in loco parentis to provide specified medical or surgical
treatment, that the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco
parentis relied solely on spiritual treatment through prayer in accor-
dance with the tenets and practices of an established church or relig-
ious denomination of which he or she is a member . . . . 4
In contrast to Arkansas’s absolute-immunity statute, Alabama’s state
law provides only partial immunity.  Alabama’s statute protects a relig-
ious parent from the crime of endangering a child, since no harm to the
3. Bill Sherman, Faith-based Healing Reviewed: The Death of a Boy Whose Mother
Failed to Seek Medical Care Puts Focus on Her Church and Others, TULSA WORLD (Dec.
31, 2010, 4:54 AM), http://www.tulsaworld.com/specialprojects/news/crimewatch/article.
aspx?subjectid=450&articleid=20101231_18_A1_Childn608615.
4. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-10(a)(9) (2006) (emphasis added).
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child actually occurred, but grants the parent no immunity for manslaugh-
ter or murder.5  Whether the state grants full or partial religious immu-
nity in these cases, this Article contends that religious exemptions violate
public policy for the protection of children as developed at common law
and in federal legislation.
This Article asks why any state would have religious exemptions that
promote the religious practice of withholding medical treatment from dy-
ing children.  After an analysis of the most probable reasons for the stat-
utes, the Article contends that all such religious exemptions should be
repealed as violating public policy.  This Article concludes that religious
exemption statutes betray the interests of both children and their parents.
Part II sets forth the working definition of religious exemption as it is
used in this Article.  Part III gives an historical overview of the faith-
healing traditions in America and the viewpoint of faith-healing parents,
and Part IV of this Article expands upon the public policy of protection-
ism for children at common law and in federal statutes and regulations.
Part V of the Article continues by elaborating upon the negative impact
religious exemptions have had upon children and their religious parents
and explains how the majority of states came to enact religious treatment
statutes while asking why any state would retain a religious exemption
that works against the best interests of children and their parents.
Part VI then goes on to address the First Amendment’s limited protec-
tions for religious actions, the limited, though fundamental right of par-
ents to the care and control of their minor children, and the reluctance of
public officials to prosecute.  Lastly, this Article argues for repeal of all
religious exemptions.  This Article concludes that there is no legal or
moral justification for religious exemption statutes that expose children
to an unconscionable degree of risk.  Further, the Article concludes that
it is contrary to principles of due process to maintain laws that send
mixed legal signals to religious parents.
II. RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION DEFINED
The term “religious exemption” as used in this Article refers to those
state statutes that supply limited or absolute immunity from prosecution
to parents who refuse to obtain medical treatment for their children for
religious reasons.
Religious or spiritual exemptions such as the one set out in the Intro-
duction are strictly creatures of the various states.  There is no federal
analog to such exemptions.  These exemptions protect religious parents
who withhold medical care from their children even at the risk of the
5. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6(b) (LexisNexis 2011).
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child’s death.  These statutes provide immunity ranging from an exemp-
tion for capital murder to lesser protections such as a religious defense to
child endangerment, criminal abuse or neglect, and cruelty to children.6
Alabama’s statute is illustrative of these lesser protection statutes:
(a) A man or woman commits the crime of endangering the welfare
of a child when:
. . . .
(2) He or she, as a parent, guardian or other person legally charged
with the care or custody of a child less than 18 years of age, fails to
exercise reasonable diligence in the control of such child to prevent
him or her from becoming a “dependent child” or a “delinquent
child”. . . .
(b) A person does not commit an offense under Section 13A-13-4 or
this section for the sole reason he provides a child under the age of
19 years or a dependent spouse with remedial treatment by spiritual
means alone in accordance with the tenets and practices of a recog-
nized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practi-
tioner thereof in lieu of medical treatment.7
These statutes in every instance protect the sincerity of adult religious
conviction at the cost of the interest of the child in his own health and his
life.  Religious exemptions, by their very nature, consistently elevate the
6. Id.;  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1104 (2007); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2(8) (2008);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1501(4) (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-4(4)(a)(4) (LexisNexis
2009); IOWA CODE § 726.6(d) (2011); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3608(b) (2007); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:93(b) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 557 (2006); Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 609.378(1) (West 2009); MO. STAT. ANN. § 568.050(4)(2) (West 1999); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 200.5085 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 639:3(IV) (LexisNexis 2007); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.22(A) (LexisNexis 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 852.1 (West
2002); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 163.206(4), 163.555 (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-490(3)(c)
(1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-157(c) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.04(k)(2)
(West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-110(3)(a) (2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.1(c)
(2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-4(a)(b) (LexisNexis 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 948.03(6) (West 2005).  Other states provide a religious exemption through an absolute
defense to any crime upon a showing by the defendant that his or her actions or inaction
was motivated by his or her religious beliefs. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(9)
(2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 2008) (In Walker v. Superior Court, 763 P.2d 852
(Cal. 1988), the California Supreme Court concluded that CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West
2008) provided an absolute defense to the misdemeanor of nonsupport); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 1104 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:93(b) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 639:3(IV) (LexisNexis 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.15(b) (McKinney 2000); OR. REV.
STAT. §§ 163.115(4), 163.118(1)(c)(B), 163.206(4), 163.555(2) (2011); TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 22.04(k)(2) (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-4(a)(b) (LexisNexis 2010).
For a detailed list of state statues see infra Appendix.
7. ALA. CODE § 13A-13-6(b).
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religious interests of the dominant parental party above the welfare of the
subservient child.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF FAITH HEALING TRADITIONS IN AMERICA
AND THE PERSPECTIVE OF FAITH HEALING PARENTS
A. Faith Healing Traditions in America
In order to understand the power of faith healing tradition in the lives
of some parents, one must have a rudimentary knowledge of the history
of faith healing.  A brief representative history is set out below.
Faith healing traditions have always been and remain part and parcel of
the American story.  In the United States, three religious traditions domi-
nate: Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.8  Each of the traditions have sto-
ries of miraculous interventions by a divine, all powerful Other.9  Faith
healing as a central tenet of belief, however, is almost an exclusively
Christian phenomenon.  The Christian focus on physical healing began
with the practices of Jesus.  The Christian gospels report that Jesus healed
lepers,10 the blind,11 and the lame.12  There are also reports that Jesus
cured people who were mentally ill,13 and he actually raised people from
8. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, as of 2000 there were approximately
133,377,000 Christian church adherents. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012 tbl. 77 (n.d.), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/
statab/2012/tables/12s0077.pdf.  In 2010, there were approximately 6,544,000 Jews in
America. Id.  The estimated number of Muslims in the United States in 2010 is 2.6 million.
The Future of the Global Muslim Population, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Jan.
27, 2011), http://www.pewforum.org/The-Future-of-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx.
9. See Ya’akov Gerlitz, Jewish Healing Prayer or Energy Healing, JEWISH HEALING
PRACTICES, http://jewishhealing.com/jewishprayerhealing.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012)
(“[B]y performing energy healing through prayer, you become energized rather than be-
coming depleted.  Not only do you become energized and receive your own healing energy,
you also, by the merit of being Hashem’s messenger, receive a Divine influx to help your
patient.”).
10. Luke 17:11–14.  Ten lepers cried out to Jesus, “Jesus, Master, have mercy on us!”
and Jesus healed them all. Id.
11. Luke 18:35–42.  A blind man was sitting beside the road to Jericho. Id.  When he
saw Jesus he asked him to restore his sight. Id.  Jesus restored the man’s sight saying,
“Receive thy sight: thy faith hath saved thee.” Id. at 18:42.
12. Luke 13:10–13.  Jesus saw a woman who had been crippled for eighteen years. Id.
Spontaneously, Jesus called to her, telling her, “Woman, thou art loosed from thine infir-
mity,” and Jesus placed his hands upon her and she was healed. Id.
13. Luke 9:37–43.  A father implored Jesus to heal his only son. Id.  The father re-
ported that his son was possessed by a “spirit” that caused him to scream and foam at the
mouth. Id.  Jesus rebuked “the evil spirit” and healed the boy. Id. See also Luke 8:26–38.
Jesus came upon a man who was naked, homeless and possessed “by demons.” Id.  After
Jesus healed the man, townsmen found the man “in his right mind.” Id.
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the dead.14 The Biblical epistles indicate that those closest to Jesus were
able to continue to heal physical ailments after Jesus was executed.15
One church scholar argues that “Christianity survived and succeeded at
least partly because of its reputation for performances of healing.”16
The early Christian church perpetuated the belief in spiritual healing,
often employing elaborate healing incantations and rituals.17  Priests ad-
ministered unction for healing to the faithful until Augustine concluded
that the Church should no longer concern itself with matters of physical
healing.18  Unction for healing became a holy sacrament for the dying.19
The Protestant Reformation ushered in a radically different view of
faith healing.  The French theologian John Calvin openly denounced the
notion that bodily healing was the province of the church, stating: “The
grace of healing has disappeared and has nothing to do with us.”20 The
mainline Protestant denominations eventually adopted the Calvinistic po-
sition, and belief in faith healing declined steeply in Europe during the
Reformation.21
It was on the fledgling American frontier that faith healing caught a
second wind of popularity.  French explorer Jacques Cartier conducted
14. Luke 7:11–15.  A funeral for a widow’s only son was in progress when Jesus en-
tered the city. Id.  Jesus commanded the dead son to get up. Id.  When the life of the
widow’s son had been restored, Jesus gave him back to her. Id.  In Luke 9:49–56, Jesus
raised Jairus’ daughter from the dead by taking her hand and stating, “My child, get up!”
Id.  In John 11:1–45, the apostle reports that Jesus called Lazarus from the tomb.  John
11:1–45.  Though Lazarus had been dead four days, Lazarus obeyed Jesus’ command to
“come out.” Id.
15. Matthew 10:1.  Jesus gave his twelve disciples the “power [against] unclean spirits,
to cast them out, and to heal all manner of sickness and all manner of disease.” Id.  In Acts
3:2–8, Peter healed a man who had been crippled from birth after Jesus had died. Acts
3:2–8.  See also Acts 5:12–16, which states that numerous sick people were healed when
Peter’s shadow fell upon them.
16. Amanda Porterfield, Healing in the History of Christianity: Presidential Address,
January 2002, Am. Society of Church History, 72 CHURCH HIST. 227-242 (2002), available
at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb050/is_2_71/ai_n28931565/.
17. SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, WHEN PRAYER FAILS: FAITH HEALING, CHILDREN, AND
THE LAW 31 (2008).  “However, these . . . trends did not displace prayer and sacramental
anointing as methods of healing . . . .” Id.
18. MORTON T. KELSEY, HEALING AND CHRISTIANITY IN ANCIENT THOUGHT AND
MODERN THOUGHT 184–85 (1973).
19. Extreme Unction, NEWADVENT.ORG, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/05716a.
htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
20. PORTERFIELD, supra note 16, at 233.
21. Peters, supra note 17.  “Protestant reformers viewed healing somewhat differently.
Appalled by excesses of the medieval church, they frowned upon the magical elements of
some healing rituals.  Reformers recognized the importance of miraculous healing the
early church, but they believed that it essentially had ceased after the apostolic age.” Id.
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healing ceremonies for Native Americans.22  Itinerant ministers such as
George Fox claimed to heal bodily illness in the name of Jesus.23  By the
end of the Civil War, faith healers such as Maria Woodworth-Etter24 and
itinerant ministers such as George Fox, claimed to heal bodily illness in
the name of Jesus; others, such as Charles Cullis, and Albert Simpson
captured the imagination of thousands with their traveling tent revivals
and flamboyant faith-healing sessions.25
In 1875, Mary Baker Eddy ushered in a radically different approach to
faith healing.26  In her first book, Science and Health,27 she proclaimed
that illness was a non-entity, a “dream” from which the Christian Science
healer is to help the patient awake from with prayer emphasizing “Truth”
and “Love.”28  Not dissimilar to the faith healers that had gone before
22. RICHARD WIGHTMAN FOX, JESUS IN AMERICA: PERSONAL SAVIOR, CULTURAL
HERO, NATIONAL OBSESSION 39 (2004); see PETERS, supra note 17, at 32 (explaining how
Jacque Cartier and his Spanish contemporary Alvar Nunez Cabeza de Vaca claimed that
they were “besieged” by Native Americans looking to be healed, which is ironic given that
the Europeans were responsible for the diseases that necessitated the healing ceremonies
in the first place).
23. PETERS, supra note 17, at 32.  In Describing one healing Fox wrote:
[I] took him by the hair of the head, and his head turned like a cloth it was so loose,
and I threw away my stick and gloves and took his head in both my hands, and set my
knees against the tree; and raised his head and I did perceive it was not broken out
that way, and I put my hand under his chin, and behind his head, and raised his head
[two] or [three] times with all my strength and brought it in, and I did perceive that his
neck began to be stiff, and then he began to rattle, and after to breathe, and the
people were all amazed.
Id. (citing GEORGE FOX, THE JOURNAL OF GEORGE FOX VOL. II 227, 234 (1911)).
24. Id. at 33. “Attendees wailed and writhed as Woodworth-Etter helped the Holy
Spirit to drive out the demons causing their illnesses, thereby restoring their health.” Id.
25. Id. at 33.  Following the aftermath of the Civil War, many Christians turned to
their Church for solace, and the late 19th century and into the beginning of the 20th cen-
tury the United States saw a rise in Holiness and Pentecostal movements. Id. Some in this
movement came to view traditional medicine as going against the teachings of the scrip-
tures and argued that true Christians should exclusively rely on prayer for healing. Id.
Grant Wacker, a prominent scholar on the history and practice of the Pentecostal move-
ment noted that during this time period, “th[e] rejection [of the practice of medicine] fit
into a broader pattern of ‘renunciative behavior’ found among many evangelical Protes-
tants.  Some Pentecostals turned their backs on medicine in much the same way that they
abandoned such other purportedly sinful practices as dancing, drinking, and smoking.” Id.
26. See, MARY BAKER EDDY, SCIENCE AND HEALTH WITH KEYS TO THE SCRIPTURES
(reprt. 1994).  In describing Mary Maker Eddy the publisher states that as, [t]he daughter
of staunch New England Calvinist parents, she protested against the idea that pain and
suffering are God’s will.  She knew intuitively that God’s will was only good, and she
turned to the Bible for answers. The insights she gained from her Bible study replaced
hopelessness with hope, and fear with love.” Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 417.  Addressing Christian Science Healers, Mary Baker Eddy instructs to
“[m]aintain the facts of Christian Science,—that Spirit is God, and therefore cannot be
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her, Eddy declared that “[t]he procuring cause and foundation of all sick-
ness is fear, ignorance, or sin.”29  However, Eddy eschewed the some-
times raucous, dramatic tent revivals that were hallmarks of her
contemporaries and she did not claim that she or any of her faith’s heal-
ers could relieve medical issues by their own ability to channel Jesus; in-
stead, she urged a program of guiding the sick towards healing
themselves through their faith.30  She ordered Christian Scientist healers
to “[i]nstruct the sick that they are not helpless victims, for if they will
only accept Truth, they can resist disease and ward it off, as positively as
they can the temptation of sin.”31  This is not, however, how she viewed
the healing of children.  In regards to a sick child, Eddy admonished par-
ents who treated their young children or infants with drugs and urged
that a child’s “needs [were] to be met mainly through the parent’s
thought.”32  She completely disregarded the existence of hereditary
diseases.33
In 1879, Eddy established Christian Science as a formally acknowl-
edged religion within the United States.34  The Church has remained rela-
tively small compared to other recognized religions, with only about
400,000 members worldwide.35  Currently, the church has a powerful
lobby that has worked both on the state and federal levels to obtain bene-
fits for its followers.  As a result of concerted lobbying, Christian Scien-
tists now have sanatoria available to them where they can receive non-
medical attention and assistance36 that is covered by both Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursements.37  While the Christian Scientists are not the
sick; that what is termed matter cannot be sick; that all causation is Mind, acting through
spiritual law.” Id.
29. Id. at 411.
30. Id. at 420.
31. BAKER EDDY, supra note 26, at 420.
32. Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
34. Anne D. Ledermann, Understanding Faith: When Religious Parents Decline Con-
ventional Medical Treatment for Their Children, 45 CASE W. RES. 891, 926 n.1 (1995).
35. Church of Christ, Scientist (a.k.a. Christian Science), RELIGION FACTS, available at
http://www.religionfacts.com/a-z-religion-index/christian_science.htm (last accessed Apr.
19, 2012).  There are active Christian Scientist groups in over seventy countries. Global
Membership, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE, http://christianscience.com/church-of-christ-scientist/
about-the-church-of-christ-scientist/global-membership (last visited Apr. 17, 2012).
36. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Am. Acad. of Pediatrics et al., in Support of Peti-
tioners, Children’s Healthcare Is a Legal Duty, Inc. v. Dir. of Health Care Fin. Admin., 532
U.S. 957 (2001) (No. 00-0914), 2001 WL 34117650. (The AAP urged the court to grant
certiorari to consider whether Medicaid or Medicare reimbursements to the sanatoria con-
stitute a state sponsorship of a particular religious belief.).
37. Id.
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only Christian denomination to practice faith healing, it is by far the most
politically powerful.
The other denominations that predicate faith itself upon a willingness
to trust in faith healing alone tend to be small congregations loosely affili-
ated with a form of Pentecostalism.38  In 1901, the Pentecostal movement
in America was started by Charles Parham.39  Parham preached a charis-
matic gospel that included physical healing as a sign of the presence of
the Holy Spirit.40  While the practices differ from congregation to congre-
gation, all Pentecostals believe in the power of prayer to bring about
healing.  Congregations such as the General Assembly and Church of the
First Born,41 Faith Assembly Church,42 the Faith Tabernacle Church,43
and the No-Name Fellowship Church,44 however, believe that resorting
to medical care shows a lack of faith.  Therefore, congregants only prac-
tice methods of spiritual healing for the purpose of curing sickness.45
While these small Pentecostal groups tend to be reclusive46 and lack the
political clout of the Church of Christ, Scientist, they have at times es-
caped prosecution because of legislation sponsored by Christian
Scientists.47
B. The Prototypical Faith Healing Parent
Adherents of faith healing hold beliefs that are likely foreign to the
majority of religious parents in America.  Such a faith healing parent,
particularly if a Christian Scientist practitioner, believes that a child’s ill-
38. Phil Anderson, Revolution began on Topeka Street, TOPEKA CAP. J. (Kan.), April
8, 2006, http://cjonline.com/stories/040806/rel_anderson.shtml.
39. History of the Pentecostal Movement, CHRISTIAN ASSEMBLIES INT’L, http://www.
cai.org/bible-studies/history-pentecostal-movement (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
40. Id.
41. In re D.L.E. 645 P.2d 271, 272 (Colo. 1982) (en banc).
42. Wayne F. Malecha, Faith Healing Exemptions to Child Protection Laws: Keeping
the Faith Versus Medical Care for Children, 12 J. LEGIS. 243, 244-46 (1985).
43. Statement of Faith, FAITH TABERNACLE CHURCH, http://www.faithwired.com (last
visited Apr. 19, 2012) (Amongst the church’s beliefs is faith “[i]n divine healing for the
body through faith in the name of Jesus and that this is part of atonement”).
44. See State v. Norman, 808 P.2d 1159 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (discussing the prac-
tices of the No-Name Fellowship Church).
45. Id. at 1160.
46. Faith-Healing Oregon Parents Acquitted of Manslaughter, TAMPA BAY ONLINE,
http://www2.tbo.com/news/breaking-news/2009/jul/23/faith-healing-oregon-parents-acquit-
ted-manslaughte-ar-93903/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
47. Will McCahill, Christian Scientists Want Health Bill to Include Prayer: Provision’s
Been Stripped from Both House, Senate Versions, NEWSER (Dec. 20, 2009 5:10 AM), http://
www.newser.com/story/76546/christian-scientists-want-health-bill-to-include-prayer.html.
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ness is not real, but rather a serious spiritual distortion.48  The parent also
believes that medical treatment will compromise the child’s spiritual jour-
ney,49 and he acts in his child’s eternal best interests by protecting the
child from medical treatment.50  He seeks to attain “Truth.”51
Believers of faith healing love their children, and they do what they
believe is best for them.52  They want their children to be cured, and they
pray with great intensity for that result.53  These parents do everything
other parents would do for their sick children except seek medical
assistance.54
Despite their powerful beliefs regarding medicine, faith-healing adher-
ents grieve the loss of their children.55  Doctor Seth Asser, a long-time
vocal proponent of repealing all religious exemptions for child-neglect
cases, visited a county cemetery in Oregon where small headstones
marked children’s graves.56  Asser himself was moved to state: “What
struck me was the fact that it was obvious from the expressions on the
headstones that the children were loved.”57
It is evident that these parents are neither indifferent nor lacking in
human passion for the welfare of their children.  From the perspective of
sincere faith-healing parents, their actions are noble and in submission to
God, taken with utmost good faith, and in their child’s spiritual best inter-
est.  The only bona fide question is whether any state should exempt
these parents from responsibility for the preventable impairments and
deaths of their children.
48. Edward Egan Smith, Note, The Criminalization of Belief: When Free Exercise
Isn’t, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1491 n.3 (1991).
49. BAKER EDDY, supra note 26, at 157.
50. Id. at 417.  “To the Christian Science healer, sickness is a dream from which the
patient needs to be awakened.” Id.
51. Id. at 420.  “[For] Truth destroys disease.” Id.
52. What is Christian Science?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE, http://christianscience.com/what-
is-christian-science#caring-for-children (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
53. Id.
54. See id. (asserting that “[p]rotecting children’s lives and promoting their health and
well being is a standard parents should all be held to no matter what means of health care
they choose”).
55. Child Deaths Test Faith-Healing Exemptions: Three Criminal Cases Revive Con-
cern over Parents Who Avoid Doctors, MSNBC (Nov. 21, 2008, 3:05:27 PM), http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/27844314.childdeathstestfaith-healingexemptions.
56. Id. (recognizing Dr. Asser for his detailed study that addressed the easily prevent-
able deaths for most of the children).
57. Id. (emphasis added).
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IV. PUBLIC POLICY PROTECTIONISM FOR CHILDREN
Faith healing parents lose children every year to treatable diseases, and
they often are exempt from prosecution for behavior that would consti-
tute medical neglect if done by a parent who did not believe in faith heal-
ing.58  The religious exemptions that provide protection for the parent at
the expense of the child represent a perplexing aberration in an otherwise
seamless public policy favoring protectionism towards children.  Both
common law doctrine and federal statutory law provide multiple means
by which the law protects children from themselves and from the adults
who might take advantage of them.  The early common law doctrine of
parens patriae59 empowered the state to protect and care for dependent
children and their best interests.  The state could—and did—intervene on
behalf of the welfare and safety of “infants, lunatics, and idiots . . . . ”60
Each state currently has its own set of statutory child protection statutes
which allow the state to intervene when a parent is neglecting or abusing
his child.  In the federal arena, Congress has enacted legislation to pro-
mote the welfare of children.  Examples of common law protections for
minor children are set out below in Part IV(A).  Examples of federal stat-
utes enacted to protect minor children are set out in Part IX(B) below.
A. Common Law Doctrinal Protections for Children
The common law recognized early on that minor children required pro-
tection from their own immaturity and from the neglect or overreaching
by adults.  Below is a brief summary of how common law doctrines in
contract, tort, and criminal law were adapted to protect minors, even at
the expense of adult rights, if necessary.
58. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5105 (2006); Williams v. Coleman, 488 N.W.2d 464,
468 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Wis. 1986). See also In
re Hauserman, Nos. 77235 & 77252, 2002 WL 451293, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2002)
(finding no criminal neglect against parents for not refilling their son’s asthma medicine);
Child Deaths Test Faith-Healing Exemptions: Three Criminal Cases Revive Concern Over
Parents Who Avoid Doctors, supra note 55 (addressing a number of state statutes that
grant an exemption for faith-healing parents in child neglect cases); Faith-Healing Oregon
Parents Acquitted of Manslaughter, supra note 46 (discussing the acquittal of Followers of
Christ, Carl and Raylene Worthington for the death of their fifteen month old daughter).
59. State of W. Va. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).  Parens
patriae is “the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of them-
selves, such as minors who lack proper care and custody from their parents. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).  It is a concept of standing utilized to protect those quasi-
sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of the people. Id.
60. Natalie Loder Clark, Parens Patriae and a Modest Proposal for the Twenty-First
Century: Legal Philosophy and a New Look at Children’s Welfare, 6 MICH. J. GENDER L.
381 (2000) (citing 2 Sir FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERICK WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 445 (2d ed. 1968)).
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1. Contracts
Common law generally provides that if a minor enters into a contract
with an adult, the minor can void the contract, regardless of the hardship
or severity of loss to the adult party.61  On the other hand, the adult party
possesses no right to void the contract if the child prefers that the con-
tract remain in force.62  The public policy underlying this protective doc-
trine rests upon the principle that adult parties to a contract can and will
protect their interests.  Children, however, do not have the capacity to
protect their interests as their youth and susceptibility to adult persuasion
hinder them from doing so.63  Thus, when a child’s right to legal protec-
tion conflicts with an adult’s right to enforce his contracts, the child’s le-
gal rights are deemed superior.  No religious exception to the rule exists.
If the adult had a religious purpose for contracting with a minor, the law
of contract would still protect the interest of the minor in voiding the
contract.  The religion of the adult would be irrelevant if enforcement of
the contract would harm the child.  The following hypothetical illustrates
this point.
Suppose that a devout Orthodox Rabbi is in urgent need of a menorah
for an impending religious celebration.  The only menorah the Rabbi
finds suitable to the occasion belongs to a fourteen year old atheist of
dubious aesthetic sensibilities.  The Rabbi offers Boy $300 for the meno-
rah.  Boy accepts.  The next day Boy learned that he could obtain $500
for the menorah from a scrap metal dealer.  Common law permits Boy to
rescind his contract, thereby frustrating Rabbi’s religious needs.  The
common law of contracts is more sympathetic to Boy’s best interests than
to the Rabbi’s religious practices.
2. Torts
The law of torts follows a similar path to that of contracts in providing
protections for children.  Early common law developed the rigid “reason-
able prudent person” standard for judging whether an adult’s conduct
was negligent.64  For adults, the law does not accept as a defense that the
adult defendant did what he thought best, if the hypothetical reasonable,
61. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, COMMON LAW COURTS VIEWED THE CONTRACTS OF A
MINOR AS VOIDABLE AT THE ELECTION OF THE MINOR CONTRACTS 222, (4th ed. 2004).
62. Id.
63. Id.; see JOEL TIFFANY, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 536 (1866) (the court refers to the
“[p]rotracted struggle . . . to protect infants or minors from their own improvidence and
folly, and to save them from the depredations and frauds practiced upon them by the de-
signing and unprincipled”).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 1-280 (1965).
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prudent person would have done differently.65  When the defendant is a
child, however, the standard is kinder, more subjective.  Common law
judged the child’s conduct against what would be reasonable to expect of
a child “of like age, intelligence, and maturity.”66  The child’s personal
immaturity is to be considered, whereas the immaturity of an adult is ir-
relevant.  The lesser standard again demonstrates a societal concern for
children and an acknowledgement that children do not possess the same
capacity to recognize dangerous situations as an adult would.67  As a soci-
ety, we do not prefer to see a minor’s future ruined by tort judgments
before he is old enough to understand the inadvisability of his actions.
To illustrate the point, again with a religious reference, suppose a child
of three accidentally burns down his entire church facility, resulting in a
multi-million dollar property loss and the church’s inability to support
missionary work.  The child will escape liability for his act because society
understands his immaturity and chooses to protect him.  The members of
the congregation may never find another place of worship that they like
so well.  Some congregants may suffer extreme mental distress due to the
child’s actions.  Nonetheless, the religious distress of adults cannot trump
the law’s protection for the innocent child.
Common law also protects children in a different negligence scenario.
Tort law is infamous for not imposing a generalized duty to attempt the
rescue of those in harm’s way.68  The proverbial trained swimmer may sit
idly by while he watches another person drown.  However, modern tort
law deviates from the general rule to state that a parent may not sit idly
by and watch his own child drown.  The parent must make a “reasonable”
attempt to rescue his child.  The special relationship between the parent
65. “The standard which the community demands must be an external one, rather
than that of the individual judgment, good or bad, of the particular individual.” Id. at
§ 283.
66. Id. at § 283A (“If the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must
conform is that of a reasonable person of like age, intelligence, and experience under like
circumstances.”).
67. DeLuca v. Bowden, 329 N.E.2d 109, 111 (1975).
[C]hildren of tender years, gradually acquire the capacity to understand and appreci-
ate the consequences of their acts as they acquire age and experience.  Only with some
maturity does a child begin to realize that his choice of acts may injure himself or
others, and only then can it be said that he possesses the capacity to act “reasonably.”
Id.
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (“The fact that the actor realizes or
should realize that action on his part is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not
of itself impose on him a duty to take such action.”).
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and his child gives rise to the specific duty imposed upon the parent,69
and states may elect to terminate the parental rights of a parent who fails
to protect their child from known danger.70  This common law duty to
take reasonable actions to protect one’s own children from danger is par-
ticularly important for purposes of this Article and will be addressed in
Section V below.
3. Criminal Law
The parens patriae doctrine of protectionism for minor children has
shaped our modern juvenile system.  When a juvenile commits an act that
would be adjudged to be criminal if committed by an adult, the child goes
to a juvenile facility, not the police station.71  All subsequent proceedings
are taken with a view towards rehabilitating the child and providing for
his safety and best interests.72  The child’s record is sealed to protect their
future prospects.73  If the child is successfully chastened by his experience
with the juvenile authorities, he enters adulthood without the liability of a
criminal record.  For example, if a fourteen-year-old steals his neighbor’s
costly crucifix and maliciously destroys it, the juvenile system will still
view the child’s best interest as paramount to the victimized adult’s right
to seek retributive justice.74
In the last decade alone the United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari review in two cases involving protections for minors.  In both cases
the Supreme Court limited the severity of punishments that the states
may mete out to minors convicted of serious crimes.  In 2005, the Su-
preme Court issued its landmark decision in Roper v. Simmons,75 holding
69. Id. The only special relationships recognized at early common law were common
carriers and their passenger, innkeepers and their guests, and one who takes another into
custody and thereby deprives him of normal opportunities for protection.  Id.
70. See In re T.G., 578 N.W.2d 921, 923 (S.D. 1998) (terminating mother’s parental
rights for failure to protect her minor children from the wrongful sexual conduct of their
stepfather).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (a)(13) (2006).
72. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS AND SARAH H. RAMSEY, CHILDREN AND THE LAW 978 (4th
ed. 2010).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 5676 (2006).
74. The juvenile court is to determine more than the mere guilt or innocence of a
child; it is “to take him in charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but to
uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen.”  Julian
W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
75. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible
behavior means “their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an
adult.”  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988).  Their own vulnerability and
comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a
greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative influences in their
whole environment. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 395 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
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that no state may execute a person for a murder he committed while be-
low the age of eighteen, however aggravated, shocking, or grisly the
crime.  The facts in Roper could scarcely have been more grisly:
Simmons [age seventeen] and Benjamin entered the home of the vic-
tim, Shirley Crook, after reaching through an open window and un-
locking the back door.  Simmons turned on a hallway light.
Awakened, Mrs. Crook called out, “Who’s there?”  In response Sim-
mons entered Mrs. Crook’s bedroom, where he recognized her from
a previous car accident involving them both.  Simmons later admit-
ted this confirmed his resolve to murder her.
Using duct tape to cover her eyes and mouth and bind her hands, the
two perpetrators put Mrs. Crook in her minivan and drove to a state
park.  They reinforced the bindings, covered her head with a towel,
and walked her to a railroad trestle spanning the Meramec River.
There they tied her hands and feet together with electrical wire,
wrapped her whole face in duct tape and threw her from the bridge,
drowning her in the waters below.76
Simmons, in a particularly heinous comment, stated that he killed
Crook, “because the bitch seen my face.”77  Notwithstanding Simmons’
depraved conduct, the Supreme Court acted to protect his life because of
his youth.78  The Court inter alia cited the “vulnerability and comparative
senting) (recognizing that juveniles are not as mature as adults, and accordingly should not
be given the same level of responsibility as adults).  The reality that juveniles still struggle
to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime
committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.  From a moral
standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult,
for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.  In-
deed, “relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature
qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness
that may dominate in younger years can subside.”  Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368
(1993).
76. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556–57 (2005).
77. Id. at 557.
78. Id. at 571.  The Court identified three differences between adults and minors:
These differences render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile falls among the worst
offenders.  The susceptibility of juveniles to irresponsible and immature behavior
means “their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.
Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate sur-
roundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to
escape negative influences in their whole environment.  The reality that juveniles still
struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a
heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character.
From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with
those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies
will be reformed.
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lack of control over their immediate surroundings”79 that characterizes
youth as reason enough to spare minors from the death chamber.80
In Graham v. Florida,81 the Supreme Court again expanded protection
for minors.  The Court ruled that no state may sentence a minor to life
imprisonment for any crime or series of crimes that do not involve homi-
cide.82  The Court issued a categorical rule giving “all juvenile nonhomi-
cide offenders a chance to demonstrate maturity and reform.”83  Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion further declared, “[t]he juvenile should not
be deprived of the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-
recognition of human worth and potential.”84  Furthermore, several de-
cades ago, the Supreme Court established that while all inmates (which
would include juveniles) are serving their sentences, they still enjoy a
constitutional right to adequate medical treatment.85
The Roper and Graham decisions leave no doubt about America’s in-
tent to protect its youth, even the most dangerous and violent juveniles.
It is, then, worse than incongruous that many of our states provide an
absolute safe harbor for adults who withhold adequate medical treatment
from innocent children—children who will die long before they can enjoy
“the opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and self-recognition of
human worth and potential.”86
Id. at 570.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 570–71.  “Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is
imposed on one whose culpabilities or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial de-
gree, by reason of youth and immaturity.” Id. at 571.
81. 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that minors cannot receive a life sen-
tence for a nonhomicide offense).
82. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).  “In sum, penological
theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders.
This determination; the limited culpability of juvenile nonhomicide offenders; and the se-
verity of life without parole sentences all lead to the conclusion that the sentencing practice
under consideration is cruel and unusual.” Id. For insight into the realities of the juvenile
justice system and analysis of Roper, and Graham, see Sarah Jane Forman, Countering
Criminalization: Toward a Youth Development Approach to School Searches, 14 SCHOLAR
301, 348–57 (2011).
83. Id. at 2032.
84. Id.
85. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  “We therefore conclude that deliber-
ate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain,’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.” Id. (citation omitted).
See also Fountain v. State, 648 So.2d. 591, 592 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (applying the Estelle
holding on adequate medical treatment to Alabama).
86. Graham, 560 U.S. __, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.
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B. Federal Acts for the Protection of Children
Just as common law doctrines sometimes impose hardship on adults to
protect children, numerous federal acts do the same.  Congress makes
liberal use of its spending power to benefit children and protect them
from adults.  Some of these acts are set out below to illustrate the strong
federal policy favoring protection of children.
The Juvenile and Delinquency Prevention Acts of 1974 and 1980 man-
dates, inter alia, that no juvenile be detained or confined in an institution
wherein they may have contact with adult inmates.87  One goal of the Act
and its amendments is to seek to protect children from the influences of
adult criminals and the prison culture.88
Congress has enacted legislation to protect minor children from the ill
effects of cigarette smoking.  Because of data indicating that adolescents
face enhanced health risks from smoking that include “cough and phlegm
production, an increased number and severity of respiratory illnesses, de-
creased physical fitness, an unfavorable lipid profile, and potential retar-
dation in the rate of lung growth and the level of maximum lung
function,”89 laws were enacted to prohibit the sale and distribution of
tobacco products to minors.90  Non-complying states lose federal block
grant funds for substance abuse prevention and treatment.91
Several national epidemiologic studies have indicated that underage
drinking is common and that a significant minority of underage youths
are heavy, episodic drinkers.92  As a result of such findings, Congress en-
acted the Uniform Drinking Age Act,93 prohibiting the purchase or pub-
lic possession of alcoholic beverages by persons under twenty-one years
of age.  A state refusing to enact such statutes would lose federal funding
for their highways.94  Congress used its spending power to influence the
states to act in protection of their children’s health and welfare.95  An-
other action enacted by Congress is codified at 23 U.S.C. Section 153, in
87. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601–5792 (2006).  “[J]uveniles alleged to be or found to be delin-
quent . . . will not be detained or confined in any institution in which they have contact
with adult inmates . . . .” Id. § 5633(a)(12)(A).
88. Id.
89. U.S. DEPT. OF HHS, PREVENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A RE-
PORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 8 (1994).  This report goes on to discuss the impacts of
smoking cigarettes on adolescents. Id. at 6–9.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26 (b)(1) (2006).
91. Id.
92. Underage Drinking: A Major Public Health Challenge NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL
ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM (Apr. 2003), http://pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/aa59.htm.
93. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
94. Id.
95. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
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this statute Congress mandated that small children be secured in a child
restraint system.  Failure to enact such a requirement would cause the
state to lose highway funding.96
There are many other federal regulations for the protection of the na-
tion’s children.  For example, 18 U.S.C. Section 922 prohibits a person
under eighteen from knowingly possessing handguns, or ammunition suit-
able only for handguns.97  This statute also prohibits persons from selling
or otherwise transferring these weapons or ammunition to someone they
know or have reasonable cause to believe is under eighteen.98  In addi-
tion, 29 U.S.C. Section 218(a) regulates child labor and protects children
from adults who seek to exploit them.99
Since there can be no doubt that public policy of the common law, the
state, and Congress all favor protectionism for children, one must ques-
tion the reason for any state statute that abandons strong public policy in
favor of granting protection to an adult.  Religious exemption statutes, as
the term is used in this Article, appear to do just that.
V. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS FOR BOTH
CHILDREN AND THEIR PARENTS
A. Illustrative Cases
No one on either side of the controversy involving religious exemptions
seriously disputes that many children have died torturous deaths when
their parents withheld medical treatment.  I argue below that the exis-
tence of immunity statutes is causally related to those deaths.  Further-
more, that the protection from prosecution and civil liability that religious
exemptions promise to parents has proven illusory, leaving many parents
embroiled in criminal prosecutions and civil litigation for years after the
death of their child.  A few representative cases clearly illustrate the ef-
fects of these statutes.
One of the most egregious cases occurred in 1956 and concerns the
untimely death of seven year old David Cornelius, the son of Christian
Scientists.100  Though David’s parents opposed medical treatment for
96. Frederick P. Rivara & David C. Grossman, Prevention of Traumatic Deaths to
Children in the United States: How Far Have We Come and Where Do We Need to Go?, 97
PEDIATRICS 791–92 (1996).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
98. Id.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2006). See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 126
(1941) (upholding the constitutionality of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, codified at
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219).
100. Henry J. Abraham, Religion, Medicine, and the State: Reflections on some Con-
temporary Issues, 22 J. CHURCH & ST. 423, 426 (1980).
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themselves or their son, David became so ill that his parents abandoned
their Christian Science beliefs and took him for medical care; a physician
immediately diagnosed David with diabetes.101  The doctor admitted
David into the hospital, began daily insulin injections, and started David
on a diabetic protocol.102  David responded with a rapid recovery.
When David was released from hospital care, his parents reconsidered
their resort to medical care and returned exclusively to spiritual practices
for David’s care.  When David fell ill again, they admitted David into a
Christian Science nursing home, a facility that did not administer medical
care of any kind.103  The child fell into a coma and died.104  The state
brought charges, but all charges were dropped when the judge opined
that if “the failure to provide medical care is the result of religious tenet
or a sincere belief in the inefficacy of medical treatment there may be no
criminal responsibility under the law.”105  This case is particularly vexing.
As discussed in Part IV.A.2, the law ordinarily requires that a parent take
reasonable steps to rescue or protect his child from known dangers.
These parents knew the child had diabetes and that he had responded
quickly to a medical diabetic protocol.  The parents also saw that David
regressed rapidly when they gave him only spiritual treatments.  The only
question remaining is whether they made reasonable efforts to save
David, knowing what they knew.  One would be hard pressed to say that
their return to the spiritual healing practice that had not worked previ-
ously was reasonable.  Yet, the state law exonerated David’s parents
solely because they acted in vindication of their own religious beliefs.
Not only do religious exemption statutes leave children of certain par-
ents at high risk, they also frequently create legal chaos for the parents.
In 1986, two high-profile cases charging parents with murder and man-
slaughter of their children by denying them medical treatment for curable
conditions hit the court system.  The two cases, one from Florida and one
from Massachusetts, both dealt with the deleterious legal effects created
by religious exemptions that provide only partial immunity from
prosecution.106
In Florida, the state charged the Hermansons with child abuse and
third-degree murder in the death of their seven year old daughter, Amy,
who died of diabetes when they failed to obtain medical treatment for
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Abraham, supra note 100, at 427.
106. Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609 (Mass. 1993); Hermanson v. State,
604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992).
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her.107  The jury found both parents guilty.108  On appeal, the Herman-
sons argued that Florida’s religious exemption statute109 caused them rea-
sonably to believe that withholding medical care for their daughter was
lawful.  The significance of the Hermansons defense cannot be over-
stated.  The Hermansons themselves alleged a causal connection between
the existence of a religious exemption statute and their failure to obtain
medical treatment for Amy.  Since they testified under oath that they
withheld medical treatment because of the statute, one is led to the inevi-
table conclusion that they would have saved their daughter’s life but for
the statute.  In any event, the Hermansons spent years defending them-
selves, finally succeeding in convincing Florida’s Supreme Court that
Florida’s religious-exemption statute failed to give parents adequate no-
tice regarding when their actions would become criminal.110
The second of the 1986 cases occurred in Massachusetts.  Toddler
Robyn Twitchell died under horrific circumstances of a treatable bowel
obstruction while his parents and a Christian Science practitioner prayed
107. Hermanson v. State, 604 So. 2d 775, 775 (Fla. 1992).
108. Id.
109. The statutory provisions are critical to the legal and constitutional issues
presented in this case.  Florida’s child abuse and neglect statutes provide:
(3)(a) “Neglect of a child” means:
1. A caregiver’s failure or omission to provide a child with the care, supervision, and
services necessary to maintain the child’s physical and mental health, including, but
not limited to, food, nutrition, clothing, shelter, supervision, medicine, and medical
services that a prudent person would consider essential for the well-being of the child;
or
2. A caregiver’s failure to make a reasonable effort to protect a child from abuse,
neglect, or exploitation by another person.
Neglect of a child may be based on repeated conduct or on a single incident or omis-
sion that results in, or could reasonably be expected to result in, serious physical or
mental injury, or a substantial risk of death, to a child.
(b) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child and in so doing
causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the
child commits a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 , s.
775.083 , or s. 775.084.
(c) A person who willfully or by culpable negligence neglects a child without caus-
ing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to the
child commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s.
775.083, or s. 775.084.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 827.03(a)–(c) (West 2012).  The third-degree murder provision of the
Florida Statutes provides that the killing of a human being while engaged in the commis-
sion of aggravated child abuse constitutes murder in the third degree and is a felony of the
second degree. Id. § 782.04 (4).
110. PETERS, supra note 17, at 122.  The Court “reversed the Hermansons’ convictions
because ‘the legislature [had] failed to clearly indicate the point at which a parent’s reli-
ance on his or her religious beliefs in the treatment of his or her child becomes criminal
conduct.’” Id.
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for him.111  Neighbors of the Twitchells testified that Robyn cried so
loudly and persistently that they found it “absolutely unbearable.”112
Robyn would have been two-years-old when the state prosecuted the
Twitchells for manslaughter.113  The jury found both parents guilty.114
The Twitchells argued that an Attorney General’s opinion regarding Mas-
sachusetts’s religious exemption misled them into believing that their ac-
tions were lawful.  To take their position to its logical endpoint, they, too,
would have saved their child’s life had there been no exemption.  The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed, holding that an Attor-
ney General’s opinion regarding Massachusetts’s religious exemption
statute could have reasonably misled the Twitchells into believing their
actions were lawful, thereby denying them due process of law.115  As a
society of laws, we cannot forget Robyn Twitchell.  His suffering and
death were not solely caused by his parents’ adherence to a faith-healing
tradition.  The existence of a religious immunity statute was an inextrica-
ble part of the chain of events that were the proximate cause of Robyn’s
death.  Robyn’s parents, who thought they were protected from prosecu-
111. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 612–21.  The opinion states:
The defendants [were] practicing Christian Scientists who grew up in Christian Science
families.  They believe[d] in healing by spiritual treatment.  During Robyn’s five-day
illness from Friday, April 4, through Tuesday, April 8, they retained a Christian Sci-
ence practitioner, a Christian Science nurse, and at one time consulted with Nathan
Talbot, who held a position in the church known as the “Committee on Publication.”
As a result of that consultation, David Twitchell read a church publication concerning
the legal rights and obligations of Christian Scientists in Massachusetts.  That publica-
tion quoted a portion of G. L. c. 273, § 1, as then amended, which, at least in the
context of the crimes described in that section, accepted remedial treatment by spiri-
tual means alone as satisfying any parental obligation not to neglect a child or to pro-
vide a child with physical care.
Id. at 612.
112. PETERS, supra note 17, at 123 (citing Doris Se Wong, Neighbor calls Twitchell’s
Son’s Cries, Unbearable, BOSTON GLOBE, May 24, 1990, at 92).
113. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 611.  The Twitchells raised the defense of entrapment by
estoppels. Id. at 619.  “Entrapment by estoppels has been held to apply when an official
assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal, and the defendant reasonably relies on
that advice and continues or initiates the conduct.”  United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710,
714 (1st Cir. 1991) (citation omitted); see United States v. Austin, 915 F.2d. 363, 365-66 (8th
Cir. 1990) (stating that “[d]efendants have the burden of proof to establish that they were
misled by the statements of a government official into believing that their conduct was
lawful”).
114. Boston Jury Convicts 2 Christian Scientist in Death of a Son, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
1980, at A12.
115. PETERS, supra note 17, at 125.  At his trial, Mr. Twitchell called a medical doctor
to testify on his behalf. Id. at 124.  Twitchell testified that his own lack of faith caused his
prayers for his son to be ineffective. Id.
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tion, spent years in court defending themselves.  The limited religious im-
munity statute betrayed everybody.
Three years later in 1989, three year old Ian Lundman died in Minne-
sota from untreated diabetes.116  The state brought second-degree man-
slaughter charges against the mother and stepfather of the child, the
McKown’s, and the Christian Scientist practitioner who assisted them in
prayer and spiritual readings.117  The charges were dismissed because
while there was no specific religious exemption for manslaughter, there
was a statute protecting parents for child neglect.118  The court concluded
that the confusion in the statutes provided the defendants the right to
depend upon Christian Science healing methods “so long as they did so in
good faith.”119 While it would seem that the good faith of the defendants
would be a question for the jury, the case never went to trial.120  In the
majority of child-death cases, the entire tragic matter would have ended
when the criminal cases were dismissed, but not so in this case.
Ian’s father brought a civil suit against his former wife, the stepfather,
the practitioner, and the Christian Science church.121  The jury awarded
Lundman $5.2 million dollars in compensatory damages and $9.15 million
dollars in punitive damages.122  The religious exemption that shielded the
defendants from criminal prosecution did not apply to civil damages.123
In this case, the law gave protection to the parents with one hand and
then took it away with the other.  Whatever one might think of the de-
fendants’ decision to treat Ian with prayer alone, one must concede that
the laws of Minnesota were a trap for the unwary religious parents re-
gardless of their “good faith.”124
While in the cases discussed above, the parents were ultimately exoner-
ated, not all religious parents have been so lucky.  In the late 1980s, Cali-
fornia prosecuted Laurie Walker for felony child endangerment and
116. State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Minn. 1991).
117. Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
118. Id.
119. McKown, 475 N.W.2d at 68.
120. Id.
121. See Lundman, 530 N.W.2d at 807 (affirming $1.5 million in compensatory dam-
ages, but reversing the award of $9.15 million in punitive damages on constitutional
grounds stating the award against the Church violated the Church’s right to espouse relig-
ious faith).
122. Id. at 815.  The trial court granted a post-trial motion for remittitur of the com-
pensatory damages from $5.2 million to $1.5 million. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.  Although Minnesota statutes exempt spiritual healers from criminal charges
of child neglect, the court found that it was appropriate to bring disputes involving conse-
quences of religious-based conduct before the civil courts where the underlying lawsuit is
not an attack on religious beliefs or principles. Id.
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involuntary manslaughter in the death of her four-year-old.125  Walker’s
defense was based on the very same premises as the Hermansons and the
Twitchells, alleging that a religious exemption found in the California Pe-
nal Code 270 caused her to believe that her actions were lawful.126  The
same issue of limited religious immunity existed; therefore, one would
expect Walker ultimately to be exonerated as well.  She was not.  The
Supreme Court of California held that immunity for one crime could not
reasonably be misunderstood to be immunity for a more serious crime.127
California’s limited religious exemption statute betrayed Laurie Walker,
and played a part in her daughter’s death.
The last case, which is also the earliest, is that of Audra Kay Whitney.
The Audra Kay Whitney case is notable among faith healing cases for its
many bizarre twists.  Audra Kay died when her medical emergency oc-
curred while she was in the care of a relative who was a Christian Scien-
tist.  The relative took her to a Christian Science practitioner, where
Audra Kay died of childhood diabetes.128  When her father returned from
a business trip and found what had happened to his child, he pressed
criminal charges against the practitioner to no avail.  Twenty-two years
later, Mr. Whitney methodically cornered the practitioner in a glass ele-
vator and shot through the glass door hitting him three times with a .32
caliber pistol.129
125. See Walker v. Super. Ct., 763 P.2d 852, 855 (Cal. 1988) (holding that exemption
to misdemeanor child neglect for parents using prayer treatment instead of medical care to
treat their children of serious medical issues did not provide a defense to prosecution for
involuntary manslaughter and felony child endangerment).
126. See id. at 856 (noting that defendant contends Section 270 of the California Penal
Code provides a complete defense to any prosecution based on the treatment of her child’s
illness with prayer as opposed to medical care).  Section 270 provides certain necessities
that parents must provide their children, and failure to do so results in a misdemeanor. Id.
The statute was enacted in 1872 and stated that every parent of any child who fails to
provide his or her child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical attention is
guilty of a crime. Id.  The statute was amended in 1925 to include the phrase “or other
remedial care.” Id.  The statute was amended once again in 1976 to clarify that “treatment
by spiritual means through prayer alone” falls under “other remedial care.” Id.
127. See id. at 872 (stating that a person relying on prayer treatment must estimate
correctly the point at which their conduct transitions into criminal negligence, and at this
point an incorrect estimation absolves immunity to a more serious crime).
128. See PETERS, supra note 17, at 109–10 (stating that a simple regimen of insulin
shots would have saved the little girl’s life, but the Christian Scientist relied only on a
Christian Science practice of removing the “illusion” of the illness, which failed).
129. See id. at 109–10.  Ironically, police officers took the injured practitioner against
his will to a hospital where expert medical care saved his life. Id. at 110.  When asked
about this departure from Christian Science practice principles, a spokesperson for the
church claimed “emergency operations did not violate its proscription of medical treat-
ment.” Id.
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The state of Illinois charged Whitney with attempted murder.130
Whitney stated unequivocally that he had shot the practitioner and had
intended to kill him.131  Whitney stated further, “I did it because he killed
my daughter.”132  Whitney could scarcely claim that he acted in the heat
of passion.133  The act he avenged happened twenty-two years previously.
Temporary insanity would also seem to be a weak defense for Whitney
insofar as he bought the gun in Birmingham, Alabama, and traveled to
Chicago with the express intent to kill the practitioner.134  Despite
Whitney’s confession and the absence of any other traditional criminal
defense, the jury acquitted Whitney of attempted murder just as years
earlier a jury had acquitted the practitioner of manslaughter.  This case
presents the ultimate in the wild legal abandon into which these cases
seem to fall.  The religious-exemption statutes either are too confusing to
impose upon an unsuspecting defendant, or juries ignore well-established
law in an effort to make things come out right.
B. Recent Developments
Since the early 1990s, few states have prosecuted parents for the unnec-
essary deaths of their children.135  The notable exception has been Ore-
gon.  In 1999, a divided Oregon legislature took a first step towards
reducing the high child death rate in the state by eliminating statutory
immunity for parents who committed second-degree manslaughter or
first- or second-degree criminal mistreatment.136
The first couple to be prosecuted under the amended statute was Tim
and Rebecca Wyland of the Followers of Christ Church.  The Wylands
treated their seventeen month old daughter with prayer alone for a
130. Id. at 110.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 829 (West 5th Ed. 2010).  Voluntary man-
slaughter in most jurisdictions consists of an intentional homicide (or attempted homicide)
committed under extenuating circumstances that mitigate, but do not justify or excuse, the
killing.  The principle circumstance is the fact that the defendant, when he killed the victim,
was in a state of passion engendered in him by an adequate provocation. Id. By the major-
ity view, however, a provoked defendant cannot invoke “heat of passion” where the provo-
cation and the time elapsing between is such that a reasonable man thus provoked would
have cooled. Id.
134. PETERS, supra note 17, at 110.
135. The state Medical Examiner of Oregon reported that more than twenty children
of the Followers of Christ Church members alone had died in recent decades from prevent-
able or curable illnesses.  None of the parents were prosecuted.
136. See Mark Larabee, Bill Aims to Lift All Oregon Religious Shields, THE OREGO-
NIAN (Jan. 22, 1999), http://www.rickross.com/reference/foc/foc8.html (indicating that in
1999, this bill “would remove religious shields from Oregon’s criminal codes”).
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hermangioma that ultimately covered her entire eye and invaded her
skull.137  The child sustained permanent impairment.138  The state prose-
cuted the Wylands for criminal mistreatment.139  A unanimous jury found
them guilty in less than an hour.140  Because the Wylands were first of-
fenders, Oregon’s sentencing guidelines called for a maximum sentence
of ninety days in jail to be issued.141
In 2011, Oregon prosecuted Dale and Shannon Hickman, members of
the Followers of Christ Church, for second-degree manslaughter under
Oregon’s amended statute.142  The Hickmans prayed while their prema-
ture newborn son died.143  The jury found them guilty, and a Clackamas
County judge sentenced Dale and Shannon Hickman to six years in
prison.144  Though the defendants promised to do whatever the court or-
dered in terms of providing medical care for their other two children in
return for probation, the court was unmoved stating: “[A]s the evidence
unfolded and the witnesses testified, it became evident to me and cer-
tainly to the jury . . . that this death just simply did not need to occur.”145
Following the high-profile Wyland and Hickman cases, the governor of
Oregon, a doctor himself, signed a bill into law in 2011 that eliminated
spiritual treatment as a defense against all homicide charges.146  District
Attorney John Foote stated that for the first time since 2008, there were
137. Steve Mayes, Rebecca and Timothy Wyland Sentenced to 90 Days in Jail, Proba-
tion in Oregon City Faith Healing, OREGANLIVE (June 24, 2011, 10:27 AM), http://
www.oregonlive.com/oregon-city/index.ssf/2011/06/oregon_city_faith_healing_couple_sen-
tenced_to_90_days_in_jail_and_three_years_probation.html.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Timothy, Rebecca Wyland Guilty of Criminal Mistreatment in Faith-Healing Trial,
RELIGIONNEWSBLOG (June 8, 2011), http://www.religionnewsblog.com/26016/timothy-re-
becca-wyland-guilty-of-criminal-mistreatment-in-faith-healing-trial.
141. Mayes, supra note 137.
142. Nicole Dungca, Opening Statements Begin in Trial of Dale and Shannon Hick-
man of the Followers of Christ Church, OREGANLIVE (Sept. 14, 2011, 10:21 AM), http://
www.oregonlive.com/oregon-city/index.ssf/2011/09/motions_begin_in_trial_of_dale_and_
shannon_hickman_of_the_followers_of_christ_church.html.
143. Id.
144. Steve Mayes, Dale and Shannon Hickman Receive 6-Year Sentence, Harshest Yet
for Faith-Healing Church, OREGANLIVE (Oct. 31, 2011, 8:38 PM), http://www.oregonlive.
com/oregon-city/index.ssf/2011/10/dale_and_shannon_hickman_of_fo.html [hereinafter
Mayes II].
145. Id.
146. See House Bill 2721, OREGANLIVE, http://gov.oregonlive.com/bill/2011/HB2721/
(last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (discussing Oregon HB 2721, which eliminates the defense of
relying on spiritual treatment for certain crimes involving a victim under the age of eigh-
teen). See also Mayes II, supra note 144 (indicating that the Oregon legislature had elimi-
nated the exemption that would allow for the reliance on spiritual treatment as a defense).
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no church members awaiting trial.147  Foote added: “We have evi-
dence . . . that many members of the church are now quietly taking their
children to doctors outside Oregon City.”148
VI. HOW THE MAJORITY OF STATES CAME TO HAVE RELIGIOUS
EXEMPTION STATUTES
Since adherents of faith-healing practices are so relatively few in num-
bers, one must question why the majority of states have enacted statutes
specifically protecting faith-healing parents.  There are four reasonably
plausible explanations for these statutory exemptions; the first explana-
tion is the most compelling.  The four explanations are: (1) The states
enacted spiritual exemptions solely in order to comply with the 1974
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act; (2) the states misapprehend
the distinctions between the absolute First Amendment right to hold re-
ligious beliefs and the limited right to act upon them; (3) the states over-
estimate the rights of parents to the unrestricted care and control of their
children; and (4) the states harbor a deep-seated reluctance to punish
parents who have lost a child because their faith healing efforts failed.
Each of these hypotheses is addressed in turn below.
A. The 1974 Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act and Its
Ramifications
In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention Treatment Act
(CAPTA) and appropriated funds to qualifying states to establish pro-
grams to reduce the incidences of child abuse and neglect.149  However,
the 1974 act contained a worrisome provision that appeared to require
qualifying states to enact a spiritual treatment exception:
A parent or guardian legitimately practicing his religious beliefs who
thereby does not provide specific medical treatment for a child, for
that reason alone shall not be considered a negligent parent or
guardian.  However, such exception shall not preclude a state from
ordering medical services be provided to the child, where his health
requires it.150
147. Mayes II, supra note 144.
148. Id.
149. Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Making for and by Children: Tensions Be-
tween Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 311, 324 (1994).  To receive federal
funds under the Child Abuse and Prevention Act, a state must enact a child abuse report-
ing law meeting federally established guidelines. Id. at 324–25.
150. Id.  “Although the initial guidelines established by the supervising federal agency
(in 1974, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare) did not require that states
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In order to obtain funds, every state either enacted a spiritual exemp-
tion, or modified a pre-existing one, to conform to the perceived require-
ments of the 1974 CAPTA.  By 1983, however, new CAPTA regulations
stated unambiguously: “Nothing in this part should be construed as re-
quiring or prohibiting a finding of negligent treatment or maltreatment
when a parent or guardian practicing his or her religious beliefs does
not . . . provide medical treatment for a child . . . . ”151  As of 1983, the
states were free to abolish their religious exemptions and still obtain
CAPTA funding.  Since few states found it important to enact religious
exemptions prior to the 1974 CAPTA requirement, one might assume
that the states would repeal their religious exemptions when the new fed-
eral regulations were promulgated in 1983; yet, most states left the ex-
emptions in effect.152  One must question why the states have kept
statutes that consistently give rise to needless child deaths and unfair
prosecutions of parents.
B. Why States Retain Religious Exemptions: A Likely Answer and
Three Poor Excuses
1. Ignorance Concerning the Statutes and Political Motives: The
Answer
The most likely answer to why states retain religious exemptions can be
contributed to ignorance and pure politics.  There are three possible po-
litical reasons why spiritual exemptions—at odds with public policy—re-
main in effect.  The first possible answer seems the least likely.  One
might assume that the legislators of every state have reevaluated their
religious exemptions in light of the 1983 regulations and found them to
have ongoing value to the citizenry.  Since most states enacted the relig-
ious exemptions strictly for monetary gain in 1974, it seems highly un-
likely that legislators would attach special value to statutes that privilege
only relatively small religious groups—if they were actually to review the
statutes.  On the contrary, it seems more probable that the majority of
legislatures never gave any further thought to the exemptions that were
hastily passes into the law in 1974.  After taking a closer look at their
exemptions, five states repealed them concluding that too many children
include medical neglect in their definitions of child abuse, the guidelines included a model
provision for religious accommodation.”  Id.
151. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.2 (d)(3)(ii) (1983).
152. Donna K. LeClair, Faith-Healing and Religious Treatment Exemptions to Child-
Endangerment Laws: Should Parental Religious Practices Excuse the Failure to Provide
Necessary Medical Care to Children?, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 79, 96–97 (1987).
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had died who could have been saved by ordinary medical care.153  Conse-
quently, the answer for the retention of such statutes must lie elsewhere.
The second possible answer seems somewhat more likely.  State legisla-
tures do not actually realize that they have statutes from the 1970s that
jeopardize children and pseudo-protect their parents.  When a child dies,
it is the court, not the legislature that has to come to grips with these
seldomly used statutes.  If this hypothesis is true, ignorance proves to be
political bliss for legislators.  What they do not know clearly is not hurting
them politically.
The third, and most disturbing answer, is purely political.  At least
some members of  state legislatures realize that the religious exemptions
exist, but they fear attracting negative public attention to themselves by
advocating repeal of anything having to do with religion.  For example, let
us assume that a very conscientious legislator is aware that his state has a
1970s religious exemption that provides total criminal immunity for a par-
ent who withholds medical care for a child for religious reasons.  The
thoughtful legislator believes the child’s right to medical care trumps any
religious practice of the parent, but he also knows his constituency is
made up of people who are “somewhat or very religious.”
First, the good legislator might reasonably fear that his prospects for
reelection will be damaged if he sponsors a bill in favor of anything that
has the word “religious” attached to it.  Second, the legislator might con-
sider all the good things he can achieve if, but only if, he is reelected.
Ultimately, he chooses not to raise the issue of the religious exemption,
perhaps assuring himself that when the right case comes along, he will
address the issue.  If the thoughts of the hypothetical legislator reflect
those of most elected officials, it seems entirely plausible that many state
legislators, having had the exemptions thrust upon their state in the 1970s
solely to obtain federal money, find themselves now politically afraid to
get rid of them.  While I address other excuses below as to why the stat-
utes retain religious exemptions, I contend that this purely political one
rings most true.
2. Excuse One: The First Amendment Free Exercise Clause
In Thomas v. Review Board,154 the Court opined that “religious beliefs
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in
153. William McCall, Child Deaths Test Faith-Healing Exemption, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Nov. 22, 2008, http://www.rickross.com/reference/foc/foc29.html.  The states are Ha-
waii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and North Carolina. Id.
154. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
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order to merit First Amendment protection.”155  This statement and
others like it might appear to say that the states must defer to any actions
taken in conjunction with any religious belief; yet, every student of law
knows better.  Every law school teaches the elegant constitutional distinc-
tions between mandated deference to belief versus the states’ right to
limit religious actions.  The majority of lawmakers, however, are not
trained in the law.  In fact, they may possess nothing more than a general,
gauzy belief that states are required—or at least would be better off—
taking a hands-off approach to anything having to do with religion.  If this
hypothesis is true, we may assume that at least some legislatures have
retained their 1970s religious exemptions because they think that the First
Amendment requires it.  In reality, the First Amendment has never re-
quired the health and welfare of a child to suffer the religion of the
parents.
While the 1878 case of Reynolds v. United States156 deals with polyg-
amy rather than parent-child controversies,157 it set the stage for later
decisions involving religious parents and their children.  Mr. Reynolds, a
Mormon, practiced polygamy in accordance with his faith.158  However,
155. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (explaining that the denial of
unemployment to a Jehovah’s Witness who quit his job after being asked to engage in a
task that violated his religious beliefs infringed on his “First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion”).
156. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
157. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (discussing whether
polygamists have a First Amendment right to engage in bigamy, against the laws of the
Territory of Utah, due to their long-held belief in the requirement of the practice of plural
marriages for salvation).
In our opinion, the statute immediately under consideration is within the legislative
power of Congress.  It is constitutional and valid as prescribing a rule of action for all
those residing in the Territories, and in places over which the United States have ex-
clusive control.  This being so, the only question which remains is, whether those who
make polygamy a part of their religion are excepted [sic] from the operation of the
statute.  If they are, then those who do not make polygamy a part of their religious
belief may be found guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and
go free.  This would be introducing a new element into criminal law.  Laws are made
for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious
belief and opinions, they may with practices.
Id.
158. Id. at 161.  Furthermore the opinion states:
[I]t was an accepted doctrine of that church “that it was the duty of male members of
said church, circumstances permitting, to practi[c]e polygamy; . . . that this duty was
enjoined by different books which the members of said church believed to be of divine
origin, and among others the Holy Bible, and also that the members of the church
believed that the practice of polygamy was directly enjoined upon the male members
thereof by the Almighty God, in a revelation to Joseph Smith, the founder and
prophet of said church; that the failing or refusing to practi[c]e polygamy by such male
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when federal officials discovered that Mr. Reynolds was practicing polyg-
amy, they took him into custody and charged him with bigamy.159  In
charging Mr. Reynolds with bigamy, the federal authorities relied on Sec-
tion 5352 of the Revised Statutes of 1875, which states the following:
Every person having a husband or wife living, who marries another,
whether married or single, in a Territory, or other place over which
the United States have exclusive jurisdiction, is guilty of bigamy, and
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $500, and by imprison-
ment for a term of not more than five years.160
Reynolds did not dispute that he was a polygamist.161  Reynolds de-
fended his actions upon a claim of absolute freedom to practice his
religion.162
The Court opined that Reynolds’s actions, while religiously motivated,
violated the strong public policy of the United States to restrict marriage
to one man and one woman.163  The Court through Justice Waite stated:
[I]t may safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the
Union when polygamy has not been an offence against society, cog-
nizable by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity.
In the face of all this evidence, it is impossible to believe that the
constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit
legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life.
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is neverthe-
less, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated
by law.  Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits
spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which
government is necessarily required to deal.164
Reynolds’s conviction stood, despite the sincerity of his belief.165  The
following portion of the opinion makes plain the principle that religious
members of said church, when circumstances would admit, would be punished, and
that the penalty for such failure and refusal would be damnation in the life to come.”
Id.
159. Id. at 146.
160. Crimes Arising Within the Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction of the United
States, ch. 3, 18 Stat. 1042, 1044 (1875).
161. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 161.
162. Id. at 161–62 (stating that Mr. Reynolds asked the trial court to instruct the jury
to find him not guilty of bigamy if the jury found that he acted pursuant to his religious
belief).
163. See id. at 165 (expressing that although a marriage is sacred in nature, it is also a
civil contract regulated by law).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 167 (explaining that when Mr. Reynolds married the second time, knowing
that he was already married, he broke the law).
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action must yield to the law of the land when the law is supported by a
substantial public policy:
So here, as a law of the organization of society under the exclusive
dominion of the United States, it is provided that plural marriages
shall not be allowed.  Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary
of his religious belief?  To permit this would be to make the pro-
fessed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,
and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.
Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.166
It is critical to consider that the Court could have set forth a religious
exemption that allowed sincere polygamists to practice plural marriage
with impunity.  However, the Court relied on the nation’s public policy
that an individual’s religious practices must not be superior to the laws of
the land and, as a result, it declined to create a religious exemption.  In
1944, the Court In Prince v. Massachusetts,167 adapted that principle to a
case when a religious parent sought to practice her Jehovah’s Witness
faith in violation of child labor laws.
Sarah Prince was a Jehovah’s Witness who followed the teachings of
her faith by disseminating pamphlets upon the public streets.168  On occa-
sion, she took her children in the evenings to assist in handing out the
pamphlets.169  The recipients of the materials paid one nickel.  An officer
took Ms. Prince into custody for child labor violations.
Prince predicated her defense upon her liberty interest in freedom of
religion and the right to inculcate her beliefs in her children.170  The
Court relied upon Reynolds in rejecting her claims, making a far-reach-
ing, indeed prescient, claim for the power of the state to protect children
from the religious acts of their parents:
[T]he family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as
against a claim of religious liberty.  And neither rights of religion nor
rights of parenthood are beyond imitation.  Acting to guard the gen-
eral interest in youth’s well being, the state as parens patriae may
restrict the parent’s control by requiring school attendance, regulat-
ing or prohibiting the child’s labor, and in many other ways.  Its au-
thority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim
to control the child’s course of conduct on religion or conscience.
166. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–167 (1878) (emphasizing that if indi-
viduals are allowed to act on every religious belief, they will overstep on the laws regulat-
ing society).
167. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
168. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 161 (1944).
169. Id. at 162.
170. Id. at 164.
2012] RELIGIOUS TREATMENT EXEMPTION STATUTES 977
Thus, he cannot claim freedom from compulsory vaccination for the
child more than for himself on religious grounds. The right to prac-
tice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or
the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health or death.171
Thus, as early as 1944, the Court unflinchingly validated the states’ au-
thority to override parental decisions that expose a child to danger based
upon religious motivation.  The Court telegraphed its future intent to
protect children from their parents’ risky religious practices by going be-
yond the facts of the case before the Court to catalogue other dangers
that would be impermissible.  After Prince, the states could have no fur-
ther real question that public policy protectionism for the physical, tem-
poral welfare of children comes ahead of validation of the religious
interest of the parents.
3. Excuse Two: The Fundamental Rights of Parents to the Care and
Control of their Children
Parents possess a paramount and fundamental right to guide the up-
bringing of their children.172  The Due Process Clause protects those lib-
erties that are “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental”173 from unwarranted interference by the
state.  The right, or as some would argue the privilege,174 to rear one’s
own offspring is unquestionably a protected liberty interest.175  The
United States Supreme Court stated that “the custody, care and nurture
of the child rests first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom
include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hin-
der.”176  The parents possess these rights in their children because the
171. Id. at 166–67 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 165–66.
173. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
174. James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doc-
trine of Parents’ Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1994).  “Thus, in a world without
parents’ rights but with an appropriate set of children’s rights, the law could recognize
parents as their children’s agents . . . .” Id. at 1429; see also James G. Dwyer, Symposium:
Spiritual Exemptions to Child Medical Neglect Laws: What We Outsiders Should Think, 76
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 147, 163–64 (2000) (discussing that parents should not be viewed as
rights-holders, but fiduciaries).
175. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. But see PETERS, supra note 17, at 196 (explaining that a
1992 survey revealed that there “was little public backing for religious exemptions to man-
slaughter and neglect laws,” referring to parents who refuse to give medical attention to
their children because of their religious beliefs).
176. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.  Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the up-
bringing and education of their children.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).
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Court observed that parents by natural disposition will more often than
not act as natural protectors of their children.177
In Troxel v. Granville,178 the Court confirmed that the decisions of a fit
parent merit special legal deference.179  According to child psychiatrists,
who agreed with the Court, parents are in a better position to provide
specialized care for a child; and only a parent or parent figures can main-
tain the stable environment and psychological parenting that are “critical
to every child’s healthy growth.”180  But, what if a parent, because of his
religion, does not take actions toward his child that reflect the “natural
protector” that the Court presupposes parents to be?  What if the special-
ized care is tantamount to no care at all?  In other words, what if the
parent fails to take reasonable steps to rescue and protect his own child,
as tort law requires?  In such cases, the state clearly can step in and pro-
tect the child.181  In other non-harmful religious decisions of parents, the
state must defer to the parents.182  Therefore, parents can insist that their
minor children attend mosque services, synagouge, or Sunday school,
even if the child does not wish to attend.  Moreover, the same parents are
equally free to deny their young children the right to attend any religious
services; and instead, steer them into agnosticism or atheism.  For the
state to superimpose its vision of what is best for the child in such situa-
tions impermissibly infringes upon the parent’s liberty interest in parent-
ing.  As a sectarian nation, the state has no legitimate interest in directing
the religious upbringing of children so long as that upbringing does no
physical harm to the child.183
Yet, the weighty constitutional liberty interest of parents must be lim-
ited by the harm principle.184  When parents exceed their common law
privilege of reasonable discipline185 or exceed the bounds of the law and
177. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
178. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
179. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 58 (2000).
180. GOLDSTEIN, FREUD, AND SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
9–10 (1979).
181. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (“[T]he state as parens patriae may restrict the par-
ent’s control . . . .”).
182. Id. at 167.
183. Id.
184. Barbara Plank, John Stuart Mill, LIBERAL INT’L, http://www.liberal-international.
org/editorial.asp?ia_id=685 (last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (citing John Stuart Mill proposing
that harm to others is the only limitation on a person’s freedom).  The harm principle is
commonly described using the analogy that “[y]our right to swing your arms ends just
where the other man’s nose begins.”  Zechariah Chafee Jr., Freedom of Speech in War
Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 957 (1919).
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 147(a) (1965) (“A parent is privileged
to apply such force or to impose such reasonable confinement upon his child as he reasona-
bly believes to be necessary for its proper control, training or education.”).
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cause harm to their children,186 they are routinely subjected to state inter-
vention.187  No state is constitutionally compelled to turn a blind eye to
the suffering of minor children.  The child is the child of her parents, but
while she remains underage, she is also a child of the state.  The hands of
the states are not tied simply because an otherwise fit parent chooses to
treat his child’s life-threatening illness by prayer alone.  Under the parens
patriae doctrine and state child welfare acts,188 the state can intervene to
186. See In re T.A., 663 N.W.2d 225, 229, 231 (S.D. 2003) (declaring T.A. to be in need
of supervision after his step-father spanked him with a belt so hard as to leave welts over
his entire torso).  “In reviewing abuse and neglect findings by the trial court, it is our duty
to ‘uphold the trial court’s decision unless the findings of fact are “clearly erroneous.”’”
Id. at 229. See also Deana Pollard Sacks, State Actors Beating Children: A Call for Judicial
Relief, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165, 1215 (2009) (describing corporal punishment in U.S.
schools).  “Between 1783 and 2002, every industrialized country in the world has acted to
prohibit school corporal punishment except the [United States], Canada, and one province
in Australia.” Id.
187. In re D.K., 58 Pa. D. & C. 4th 353, 354, 361 (Pa. Comm. Pl. 2002) (declaring a
sixteen year old boy dependent because his weight had grown to 451 pounds, causing him
to suffer numerous health concerns). See also In re S.T., 928 P.2d 393, 396, 401 (Utah App.
1996) (removing four children from their parents for unsanitary home conditions and an
unexplained burn on the palm of one child); In re N.M.W., 461 N.W. 2d 478, 479, 482 (Iowa
App. 1990) (terminating the mother’s parental rights because she failed to clean her apart-
ment after repeated visits from the Department of Human Services).
188. See UTAH CODE ANN. 78A-6-105 (LexisNexis 2008) (providing definitions which
are generally representative of child protective statutes in the other states).
(1)(a) “Abuse” means:
(i) nonaccidental harm of a child;
(ii) threatened harm of a child;
(iii) sexual exploitation; or
(iv) sexual abuse.
(b) “Abuse” does not include:
(i) reasonable discipline or management of a child, including withholding privileges;
(ii) conduct described in Section 76-2-401; or
(iii) the use of reasonable and necessary physical restraint or force on a child:
(A) in self-defense;
(B) in defense of others;
(C) to protect the child; or
(D) to remove a weapon in the possession of a child for any of the reasons described
in Subsections (1)(b)(iii)(A) through (C).
(2) “Abused child” means a child who has been subjected to abuse.
(3) “Adjudication” means a finding by the court, incorporated in a decree, that the
facts alleged in the petition have been proved.
. . . .
(25)(a) “Neglect” means:
(i) abandonment of a child, except as provided in Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 8, Safe
Relinquishment of a Newborn Child;
(ii) lack of proper parental care of a child by reason of the fault or habits of the
parent, guardian, or custodian;
980 THE SCHOLAR [Vol. 14:945
save a neglected child, and there is no constitutional mandate that the
states provide the parents with immunity for their failure to act.
4. Excuse Three: Reluctance to Punish Parents
The three most commonly cited justifications for imprisonment are the
following: (1) protection of the public at large,189 (2) deterrence of the
defendant and others from committing such acts,190 and (3) punishing the
defendant.191  None of these justifications seems to fit with the punish-
ment of a bereaved parent.
a. Are the Parents a Threat to the Public at Large?
No one seriously argues that religious parents, whose prayers have
failed to save their child’s life, present a threat to the public.  Their beliefs
can have no effect on those of us who do not subscribe to the same be-
liefs, a fact that helps explain the sanguine attitude of the public about
the whole subject.  If, however, a believer in spiritual healing isolated the
child of a public figure, such as Malia Obama,192 and withheld medical
care in good faith until she died, the entire nation would mourn the loss,
and there would be a public backlash against religious exemptions.
(iii) failure or refusal of a parent, guardian, or custodian to provide proper or neces-
sary subsistence, education, or medical care, or any other care necessary for the child’s
health, safety, morals, or well-being; or
(iv) a child at risk of being neglected or abused because another child in the same
home is neglected or abused.
Id.
189. JOSEPH J. SENNA & LARRY J. SIEGAL, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 33
(3d ed. 1984).  The purpose of incapacitation “is protection of the law-abiding members of
society by limiting the activities and freedom of known criminals.” Id.
190. Id. at 32.  “[R]esearch on deterrence has provided little hard evidence that deter-
rent measures can actually achieve their desired effect.” Id.; FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING,
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY ISSUES:  PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 3 (1971).
The theory of simple deterrence is that threats can reduce crime by causing a change
of heart, induced by the unpleasantness of the specific consequences threatened.
Many individuals who are tempted by a particular form of threatened behavior will,
according to this construct, refrain from committing the offense because the pleasure
they might obtain is more than offset by the risk of great unpleasantness communi-
cated by a legal threat.
ZIMRING, supra.
191. SENNA & SIEGAL, supra note 189, at 103.  “Retribution or revenge rests on the
idea that it is right for the offender to be punished.  This view holds that each person is
responsible for individual actions and deserves to be punished with breaking societal
norms.” Id.
192. Malia is the eldest daughter of President Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle
Obama.  Colleen Curtis, First Look: New Obama Family Portrait, THE WHITEHOUSE BLOG
(Dec. 15, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/12/15/first-look-new-
obama-family-portrait.
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Likely, every spiritual exemption left over from the 1970s would be im-
mediately repealed.  But, that scenario is improbable.  Spiritual healing
believers usually confine their practices to themselves and their own chil-
dren.  So, concededly, such people do not pose a threat to public safety.
b. Will Criminal Sanctions Deter Others from Withholding
Medical Care from their Children?
In her eloquent article,193 Anne Lederman argues that the threat of
imprisonment will have little, or no, deterrent effect on parents.  She con-
tends that religious parents will not abandon their spiritual practices be-
cause they believe that to do so would actually harm the child.194  In
some cases, Lederman may be correct.  In so many cases, however, the
parents’ testimony at trial indicates clearly that they wished to engage in
spiritual practices, but they also were strongly motivated to remain within
the bounds of law.
In Twitchell,195 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reversed
the convictions, stating, pointblank, “Evidence showed that the defend-
ants were deeply motivated toward helping their child, while at the same
time seeking to practice their religion within the limits of what they were
advised that the law permitted.”196  The Hermansons also argued that they
were influenced by the existence of a religious exemption.197  The same
can be said for Rita McKown198 and Laurie Walker.199  The specter of
193. Lederman, supra note 34, at 923.
Enhancing the child’s welfare motivates the parent’s religiously influenced decision,
not avoiding legal culpability or obtaining any tangible benefits from the state.  Be-
cause the religious directives embody the power of the sacred, the parent who unques-
tioningly relies on faith and spiritual healing perceives much greater harm to the child
in deviating from those tenets than in the threat of prosecution from the state.
Id. at 923–24.
194. Id.
The sincere intent of religious parents to promote the child’s well-being also limits the
deterrent effect of the threat of legal punishment.  For the believer in spiritual healing,
the choice is not between the child’s health and the individual’s selfish desire to act on
his religious belief.  Rather, the reliance on spiritual treatment stems from an honest
feeling that it is the most effective way of caring for oneself and one’s child.  Attesting
to the sincerity of the Christian Scientist position that spiritual treatment most effec-
tively promotes the child’s well-being, the Manager of the Christian Science Church’s
Committee on Publication, Nathan A. Talbot, explains that “if the only two options
for care were medical treatment or no treatment, Christian Scientists like others
would undoubtedly choose medical treatment.”
Id. at 923 (footnote omitted).
195. Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d 609, 611–12 (Mass. 1993).
196. 604 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1992).
197. Hermanson v. State, 604 So.2d 775, 780–81 (Fla. 1992).
198. State v. McKown, 475 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Minn. 1991).
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spending six years in prison motivated Dale and Shannon Hickman to
promise the court that they would seek medical treatment in the future
for their surviving children.200  These cases and others like them lead in-
escapably to the conclusion that the existence of religious exemptions
does in fact influence parental behavior.201
c. Will Imprisoning Parents Serve Any Appropriate Function
of Justice?
After Ian Lundman died, MarieAlena Castle began an attempt to re-
peal Minnesota’s religious exemption.202  She persuaded two members of
the Minnesota legislature to sponsor the bill.203  Ian Lundman’ father,
Doug Lundman, and a handful of others gave testimony about the losses
they had personally sustained as a result to faith healing practices.204
Senators Allan Spear and John Marty, who blocked the repeal bill in the
Senate, indicated that “they did not want to prosecute well-meaning par-
ents.”205  The problem is that Ian’s mother was prosecuted in Minnesota.
One must assume either that the legislators did not see the irony of their
position; or as previously suggested, they had a personal political concern
about casting a vote against a religious exemption.
There is considerable merit to an argument that when our prison sys-
tem is bursting,206 it seems counter-productive to send otherwise law-
abiding parents to prison, especially when they were entrapped by a relig-
ious exemption.207  Creative sentencing might, however, ameliorate the
199. Walker v. Super. Ct., 763 P.2d 852, 855 (Cal. 1988)
200. Supra Part V.B, notes 141 thru 145.
201. See People v. Rippberger, 231 Cal. App 3d. 1667 (1991); State v. Norman, 61
Wash App 16 (1910)
202. See MarieAlena Castle, No Legal Protection for Kids in Faith-Healing Families:
Why Most States Sanction Religion-Based Child Sacrifice, ATHEISTS FOR HUM. RTS., http://
atheistsforhumanrights.org/child.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2012) (describing Castle’s lobby-
ing for repeal of the Minnesota faith healing statutes, in her own words).
203. Id.  Namely, Castle persuaded Representative Phil Carruthers and Representa-
tive Jane Ranum to support the bill against the religious exemption in Minnesota. Id.
204. Id.  Castle described the five-year process of attempting to repeal the religious
exemption statute as “lengthy and painful.” Id.  Joni Clarke testified about her baby dying
because of Clarke’s adherence to faith-healing, and Sue McLaughlin discussed the lack of
medical attention due to her parents’ Christian Science beliefs, resulting in her mental and
physical handicap. Id.
205. Id. The repeal bill won in the House Judiciary Committee 15-5, and won on the
House floor 101-30. Id.
206. STATE OF CONN., WHAT IS CAUSING PRISON OVERCROWDING? 1 (2007), availa-
ble at http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/cjppd/cjresearch/recidivismstudy/whatiscausingprison
overcrowding.pdf.
207. Imprisonment for these parents will be costly to the state.  According to esti-
mates, it costs the state about thirty thousand dollars a year to house one inmate. Sandra
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social ills that imprisoning parents can cause.  The court could impose
weekends-only jail terms that allow one parent to remain home if there
are other children.  The courts can always dispense with incarceration in
favor of probation and community service, but the state’s interest in pro-
tecting its children would be somewhat vindicated.
VII. WHY RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS SHOULD BE REPEALED
It has always been a strong public policy of this nation to protect chil-
dren from their own immaturity and from adults who do them harm.  As
stated in the above sections, the U.S. Supreme Court has never held that
the right of an adult to engage in religious acts transcends the state’s in-
terest in protecting children from harm.  No federal acts require the states
to maintain a religious exemption.  On the contrary, federal legislation is
frequently enacted for the sole purpose of encouraging the states to pro-
tect children from situations that threaten their lives and best interests.
Still, no mandate exists that prevents states from enacting a religious ex-
emption.  This issue has not yet been entertained by the Supreme Court
and may never be addressed.  Thus, it is vital that states revisit their ex-
emption statutes and assess the legal rationality and morality of retaining
such statutes.
Since children are not a constitutionally suspect class,208 the state need
only show that a statute is rationally related to a legitimate state inter-
est.209  The states can show a legitimate interest in promoting religious
diversity and freedom of parents to rear their children in their faith.
What they cannot show is that religious exemption statutes actually pro-
mote either in a way that is beneficial to the parties or to society at large.
If the religious exemptions are repealed, parents will still be entitled to
religious freedom and to teach those beliefs to others.  The only differ-
ence will be that more of their children will grow up to decide for them-
selves what they believe and what they will practice.  Almost as
important, if all religious exemptions are repealed, religious parents will
have the dignity of knowing where they stand with the law.  They can still
Feigley, How Much You Pay to Imprison Citizens, PRISONERS.COM, http://www.prisoners.
com/costbud.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2012).
We taxpayers spend more to imprison a person in Pennsylvania than it would cost to
send him to the best state college, almost twice as much, as a matter of fact . . . .  For
about $18,000 he could get a college education.  For about $25,000 he could be fol-
lowed around on the street by a parole agent, one on one.  But that wouldn’t satisfy
the revenge crowd.
Id.  Ironically, “the average prisoner costs $4,319 for medical care each year.” Id.
208. See generally Dwyer, supra note 174 (providing an outstanding argument for
Equal Protection granting children the suspect classification).
209. Id. at 1379.
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practice faith healing upon their children, but they will not be able to
continue the practice until the child is dead without impunity.  Repeal of
the statutes would leave parents with an unobstructed view of the conse-
quences of their choices.
The only remaining issue is how such reform in the law can be effectu-
ated.  The parents who practice faith healing on their children have a
vested interest in keeping their own protections.  The children who are
most imperiled by such statutes have no voice at all.  Even advocates such
as Dr. Seth Asser and Rita Swann readily admit that their successes have
been few, and legislators may have political reasons for not championing
such reform.
The only hope for reform is to create an educated electorate.  If there is
to be reform, it may fall to the bar associations of the fifty states to act.
Every bar association funds a certain degree of legal education for the
public.  Few uses of bar association funds could be more meritorious than
using them to educate the public about the dangers these statues pose.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Religious exemptions, by their nature, violate the strong public policy
of the nation in protecting its minor children.  Most religious exemptions
were enacted in the early 1970s in order to obtain federal funds for the
prevention of child abuse.  In 1983, Congress stated in its regulations that
no state needs a religious exemption to qualify for the federal grants, thus
freeing the states to repeal the statutes.
Religious-exemption statutes work mischief in the law whenever they
are invoked.  If a statute grants anything less than absolute immunity,
religious parents are justifiably confused regarding their protections.
When such statutes grant religious parents absolute immunity, the state’s
interest in protecting its children is absolutely abrogated.  Whether a state
grants partial or absolute immunity, the state finds itself in the position of
giving its approval to situations that lead to the unnecessary suffering and
deaths of children every year.  Every state should repeal its religious ex-
emptions, and every bar association should lead the movement.
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IX. APPENDIX:
LIST OF STATES RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION STATUTES210
210. NAT’L CNTR. FOR PROSECUTION OF CHILD ABUSE, NAT’L DIST. ATT’Y ASSOC.,
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION STATUES (Aug. 2010), available at http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/
Religious%20Exemption%20Statutes%20Aug%202010.pdf (reprinted in its entirety with
permission of the NCPCA/NDAA).

